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Piotr Machura
Luck, Ignorance, and Moral Attitude
Abstract: Public opinion has it that ethics should be concerned with studying 
and providing precise and reliable rules of conduct. This view is based in a long 
philosophical tradition which begins with the Stoics and continues at least to Kant; 
it is, however, a false view. There are good reasons to turn our attention to these 
aspects of moral thinking which refer to and emphasize the element of risk and uncer-
tainty. In the article I briefly discuss two of such reasons: the problem of moral luck 
and the problem of action based on ignorance. Consideration of these two problems 
leads to the conclusion that the most tricky element in moral thinking is the firm 
belief of the subject in the truth of the premises on which they base their actions 
and in the irrelevance of external factors to the assessment of their deeds. In this 
light I argue that the basic requirement for a moral justification of a particular action 
is not its conformity to a certain set of rules but the subject’s critical reflection on their 
course of action. Indeed, what turns an attitude into a moral attitude is an amoral, 
epistemological factor: criticism and openness to uncertainty.
Keywords: ethics, critical thought, philosophical criticism, moral luck, ignorance, 
moral attitude
It would seem that ethics is that field of knowledge which should 
support man in offering indications as to the proper way to act (along 
with their justification). In the basic formula of moral reasoning, 
i.e. the practical syllogism going back to Aristotle, in which the major 
premise is constituted by the description of a certain good or a moral 
principle, while the minor premise is constituted by the description 
of the situation in which the subject finds himself, and the conclusion 
is action (or, in accordance with the correction introduced by St. Thomas 
Aquinas, a decision), all the elements of the reasoning seem to head 
in the direction of achieving a justified conviction about the rightfulness 
of the action undertaken on its basis. In consequence, the moral attitude 
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that Aristotle posits is based on the weighing of rightful evaluations 
and habits on the basis of those rightful convictions, which—strength-
ened by the effect of intellectual virtues—are to lead to the achievement 
of an objectively-correct vision of human good.
This absolutizing concept of ethics that accents the rightfulness 
and certainty of the normative basis of action was strengthened 
by Kant, especially in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.1 
In his understanding, what determines a decision’s rightfulness is good 
will, the criterion of which is agreement with the formal principle 
of the categorical imperative. Thus, when I ask myself what I should 
do in a given situation, how I should behave towards a given event 
or given person, what determines the rightfulness of my decision 
is an affirmative answer to the question of whether I could want the rule 
lying at the basis of the chosen solution to be universally-binding. 
We must note, however, that both Aristotle’s and—especially—Kant’s 
conceptions seem to possess several essential limitations. First of all, they 
are based on the premise that the knowledge on the basis of which the sub-
ject acts is at the very least justified, i.e. that the subject is aware of all 
the essential facts providing for the axiological character of the object 
of the decision and the action. In Kant’s conception in particular the sub-
ject’s conviction as the rightfulness and exhaustive character of his moral 
reasoning seems to be an irrefutable element. Second, within the bounds 
of such an understanding, little significance is given to the external con-
ditions affecting the evaluation of the decision and the action. 
All of these elements raise certain doubts, which are tied above all 
with the availability of sufficient information that would allow for a fully 
justified decision about a given action to be made. In practice, it is rare 
to find a situation where the subject has certain knowledge regarding 
both premises of the reasoning at his disposition. On the one hand, pro-
found reservations concerning the legitimacy of norms of traditional 
1 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M. Gregor (Cambridge: 
Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1998).
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morality appear (regarding the treatment of animals, for example), 
on the other hand—full knowledge concerning the situation in which 
a subject must act is rare. And this concerns both a full, exhaustive 
description of the unintended consequences of the action being under-
taken, and those elements and aspects that cannot be taken into con-
sideration by the subject due to his limitations. 
Thus, we should ask the question of what the relationship is between 
these aspects of action, which elude classically-understood forms of moral 
reasoning—a lack of knowledge and luck—and the proper form of moral 
attitude. The main thesis of the following reflections is that what makes 
our decisions and acts moral is precisely the fact that we take these ele-
ments into account and that, simultaneously, we submit our normative 
premises and available knowledge to a critical analysis. In the last part 
of the article, I indicate that the virtue which in a fundamental way char-
acterizes a certain hexis as moral is a type of open-mindedness, directed 
at the possibility of taking into account new facts and alternative stand-
points, and—above all—a critical attitude towards its own normative 
premises and decisions. In other words, what determines a morally-posi-
tive evaluation of decision and action is a type of constitutive uncertainty 
and an analysis of one’s own way of forming judgments and decisions.
Moral Luck and Moral Evaluation
The main limitation of the absolutizing conception of ethics is the lim-
ited character of human agency. These limitations may derive from either 
the subject himself/herself, or be the result of external factors. 
Let us first take a look at the second case. The basic problem 
in the Kantian conception of morality is the heteronomy of moral 
evaluation. Its essence is the incompatibility of the internal criterion 
of legitimacy proposed by Kant and the rightfulness of a given action, 
and the external evaluation of the moral act as imposed by others in con-
nection with the public character of action. In essence, the subject’s inter-
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nal convictions about the rightfulness of his action can not only be ques-
tioned by undermining the legitimacy of the principle on which it rests, 
which Bernard Williams calls2 intrinsic luck, but also even the subject’s 
deepest conviction, manifest in action, becomes the object of public evalu-
ation (extrinsic luck). As Williams notes, a positive evaluation of such 
action—and, consequently, of the subject himself/herself—will depend 
on what the conditions of the evaluation are. Such conditions remain 
beyond the subject’s control. 
This is not only because these conditions are determined by the dis-
tance in time between four elements: the decision, the execution 
of the action, the appearance of its consequences, and its evalua-
tion, but also by the actions of others. Thus, this is not only the ques-
tion of information dispersal, but also of the possibility of an essential 
change appearing that would repeal the legitimacy of the decision upon 
which the action was undertaken. To show how external circumstances 
condition moral evaluation, in Moral Luck Williams uses the example 
of Gauguin as the figure of an artist who commits an immoral action 
in order to open the door to achieving his artistic potential. What is espe-
cially interesting in this example is the asymmetry between the number 
of conditions that lead to the positive or negative evaluation of Gauguin’s 
action. On the one hand, its positive evaluation—which is not a moral 
evaluation3—is based solely on his artistic success,4 while a negative 
2 Bernard Williams, “Moral Luck,” in: Moral Luck (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University 
of Cambridge, 1981), p. 26.
3 One of the effects of Williams’ analysis is that it drew attention to the necessity of limiting 
the applicability of moral principles. It seems that this conclusion can be generalized—one of the tasks 
of ethics is to delimit the boundaries of its indications’ applicability and its relation to other systems 
of norms. However, on the descriptive level, the fact remains that the evaluations of accomplishments 
often take precedence over moral evaluations, which become only (at most) components of a certain 
practical evaluation. This evaluation is of a social character—it is the reaction of a group that feels 
the effects of a given subject’s action—and as such seems to hierarchize individual systems of norms 
in a manner dependent on the significance of a specific aspect of the subject’s action for society. That 
is why the relationships between individual components are mutable and depend—among other things—
on the social role, or rather—on which aspect of the subject’s action is most important from the group’s 
point of view. In this sense, insofar as for the majority of people a moral evaluation may be the most 
important in their overall evaluation, for a renowned artist it may be of secondary importance.
4 A separate question is the extent to which this success must be achieved in a relatively short 
time. From a philosophical point of view, it would be interesting to trace the way in which moral 
evaluations vary in time. The question of these evaluations’ mutability in time also remains open. 
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evaluation can be upheld (sic!) by the appearance of a range of factors 
that are only partially dependent of on the action of Gauguin himself: 
from the wreck of the ship taking him to Tahiti, through the problems con-
nected with becoming accustomed to a new environment, to the changing 
market conditions, which, in a way, constitute the material basis of artis-
tic success. 
What makes a given action moral5 is its social character, i.e. its sig-
nificance for other people. In the example cited by Williams, what makes 
it impossible to pass by Gauguin’s actions indifferently and what makes 
it the object of moral evaluation is that immoral fact (the abandonment 
of his family) which constitutes the source of all his later success. The ambi-
guity that appears here is complex—not only the comprehensive evaluation 
of Gauguin’s action is based on the element of luck, trust in the benevo-
lence of external factors, but above all the lack of a solution to the ques-
tion of whether non-moral success (the achievement of an essential non-
moral value) can outweigh a negative moral evaluation. On the one 
hand, conscientiousness, if not moral rigorism, suggests that the viola-
tion of a moral principle to achieve non-moral good may lead to a slippery 
slope, and in effect each immoral action will be able to be justified on non-
moral grounds. On the other hand, though, too great a rigorism would 
have to result in pressure to relinquish—thus, it would be morally right 
for Gauguin not to abandon his family and go to Tahiti, and in conse-
quence not to achieve artistic success. What is doubtful here is the lim-
itation of morally-acceptable action in a way that would have to result 
in the decrease of artistic talent, excessive conservatism, and the prohi-
bition of innovation: intellectual, artistic, and social (as laden with moral 
risk). The essence of the controversy is not a choice between good and evil, 
but a choice between one good and another (whose achievement also 
encompasses a certain negative element)—the good of Gauguin’s family 
and the good of all the (potential) recipients of his artwork. 
5 I take action to be moral when it might be described as aiming—at least prima facie—
at benefiting to or limiting other agent’s possibilities of flourishing.
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How could a subject considering a similar action find justification 
for its deed? As Williams notes, the key to evaluating a project like 
Gauguin’s, that, which essentially decides about its success, is the legiti-
macy of undertaking it. In other words, examining these types of situ-
ations, we may deal with several different possibilities: 
a) Gauguin commits an immoral act, after which he goes ahead 
with his intention; its evaluation is positive; 
b) Gauguin commits an immoral act, though external factors pre-
vent the achievement of the project or its evaluation is impossible;
c) Gauguin commits an immoral act in the name of a project based 
on a false evaluation of his own abilities, and in effect fails; 
its evaluation is negative;
d) Gauguin does not commit any immoral act and gives up the proj-
ect; the moral evaluation is positive as long as it does not take 
into account social (non-moral) benefits.
The last point give rises to a particular moral ambiguity, for, on the one 
hand, it seems that the moral evaluation of a subject fulfilling its duties, 
especially basic duties and ones that refer to an asymmetrical relation 
of causal power (as in the relation to children), is clear. On the other hand, 
though, a positive evaluation formulated in this way gives rise to anxiety 
due to its limited character, for it does not take into account the benefits 
that the realization of the project could bring: benefits made possible 
thanks to the immoral deed. It seems that a certain form of ambiguity 
and a certain level of complexity in evaluating the action is unveiling itself 
here. It does not only refer to the system of norms in which the evalua-
tion if formulated, but also to the scope of information available to the one 
making evaluations. In this sense, the last of the listed elements contrasts 
with Kant’s conception—just as Kant wanted to avoid the ambiguities 
of evaluations that involved non-subjective elements, so the fourth pos-
sibility takes these into account above all, or at least contrasts the sub-
jective element with the broader significance of its action. The objections 
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towards the ways of evaluation are similarly symmetrical—as Kant 
seems to miss the non-individual, social character of actions (any actions, 
not only moral ones), so advocates of the fourth possibility would have 
to equally peremptorily demand the decision-making subject to achieve 
the position of an ideal observer, who would, in addition, be endowed 
with the ability of predicting the future. 
Thus, the factor that determines the evaluation of action is the ade-
quacy of the evaluation by the subject himself. Here, however, the ele-
ment of luck appears once more, this time with a dual orientation: 
on the one hand, this is a possible defect in the construction of the pro-
ject itself, its incorrect formulation, a false evaluation of the possibili-
ties of the subject itself, in the second case, however—which Williams 
does not seem to pay sufficient attention to—this luck concerns the way 
in which the subject can construct his project. In other words, the second 
type of intrinsic luck concerns both the scope of knowledge on the basis 
of which the subject can gain conviction about the project’s legiti-
macy and feasibility, and the identity of the subject—the way in which 
the environmental conditions he is raised in and the level of intellectual 
tools he has access to allow him to gain this type of conviction. Hence, 
whether or not the agent’s act deserves positive evaluation depends, 
at least to a certain degree, not on his efforts, but on whether the agent’s 
depiction of the situation is adequate, that is—on whether or not all rel-
evant facts were taken into consideration.
Ignorance, Responsibility, and the Fear of Action
In the analysis of luck, an essential doubt comes to light concerning 
the relationship between the consciousness of the acting subject (his 
knowledge and ability to reason adequately) and his limited agency, 
and the scope of the action’s consequences along with the social, non-
individual character of the evaluation. The element that seems key 
here is the tension between possible ignorance, on the basis of which 
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the subject acts, and his responsibility. As Michael J. Zimmerman 
notes, the basic form of ignorance we are dealing with when asking 
about the agent’s responsibility for his action is the lack of aware-
ness concerning morally-essential facts.6 The point of departure of his 
analysis is a thought experiment in which he considers the question 
of the responsibility of the agent, who, giving aid to the victim of a car 
accident and presuming that the damaged vehicle may explode (which 
does not occur), causes the victim’s paralysis. The element that morally 
inculpates the agent in this case is his lack of awareness of the risk 
connected with improperly giving aid, which—in Zimmerman’s opin-
ion—the agent should be aware of. The problem here lies in determining 
the character of such a duty, as such a view may lead to the imposition 
of unreasonably high—thus unrealistic—standards of knowledge that 
each individual should possess. What conditions must be fulfilled, then, 
for responsibility for ignorance to be possible?
According to Zimmerman, the subject must be made responsible 
for actions committed on the basis of ignorance only when he is responsi-
ble for this ignorance; at the same time, he notes that no one can directly 
control his unawareness.7 The question arises, however, if it can be indi-
rectly controlled. The solution Zimmerman proposes gives birth to cer-
tain doubts, as he states, which it is impossible not to agree with, that 
in the situation described above the subject is evidently guilty of “careless-
ness, or inconsiderateness, or something of that sort.”8 However, he rejects 
this solution as incorrect, indicating that the subject may be unaware 
of his ignorance, and especially of the fact that this ignorance possesses 
moral significance. We can add that in essence, though the experience 
of ignorance is a part of each human being’s experience, it is not usu-
ally a problem, because the range of knowledge which we do not pos-
6 Michael J. Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance,” Ethics 1997, No. 107, p. 412.
7 M. J. Zimmerman, p. 414. For definitions of direct and indirect control see Zimmerman, 
p. 415: “One is in indirect control of something, X, if and only if one is in control of it by way 
of being in control of something else, Y, of which X is a consequence. […] One is in direct control 
of something if and only if one is in control of it in some way that does not involve being in control 
of it by way of being in control of something else.”
8 M. J. Zimmerman, p. 416.
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sess—(potentially) extending into infinity—cannot be the object 
of our reflection, and especially not an element of practical reasoning. 
That is why the essential problem here, as Zimmerman notes, is that 
“[c]arelessness and inconsiderateness typically involve a failure to believe 
(at the time) that one is being careless or inconsiderate.”9 Consequently, 
the author notes that this type of unawareness can only give 
rise to indirect responsibility, connected with the responsibility 
for something else (i.e. for that, which causes the subject to lack 
awareness as to the carelessness of his action), etc. Reasoning similarly 
for inattentiveness, Zimmerman states that responsibility for unaware 
behavior (based on ignorance), “must be rooted in culpability that 
involves no ignorance.”10 This conclusion seems doubtful, and its critique 
will be significant for the further part of my argument. 
Modifying his conclusions somewhat, Zimmerman indicates an addi-
tional condition of responsibility: not only can it solely concern that, 
with which the subject is “cognitively connected,” but it must also encom-
pass conscious adverting to these objects.11 The essence of responsibility 
understood in this way is, as Zimmerman states, the subject’s awareness 
that he did something morally wrong. Two doubts arise in connection 
with this statement. First of all, as Zimmerman himself notes, such 
a belief “can be merely dispositional, rather than occurent.”12 In the first 
case, this adverting is unnecessary, since the subject will not have 
a tendency to contemplate this belief before undertaking an action. 
However, these occurent beliefs are necessary to constitute culpability. 
Otherwise, they do not seem to participate in practical reasoning 
and are not motivational components effectively shaping specific actions. 
Second, a stronger conception of responsibility than the one Zimmerman 
proposes can be accepted, where the subject’s belief does not have 
any real significance in acknowledging the responsibility the subject 
9 M. J. Zimmerman, “Moral Responsibility and Ignorance,” p. 416.
10 M. J. Zimmerman, p. 417.
11 M. J. Zimmerman, p. 421.
12 M. J. Zimmerman, p. 421.
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bears. Such a proposal was put forth, among others, by Roman Ingarden, 
who, in analyzing the basic forms of responsibility13 indicates bearing 
responsibility, an ontological state connected with the fact that 
the subject realizes a “negatively-valued current state of affairs,”14 
which is independent from the one that the subject taking responsibility 
is conscious of.
That is why it seems that the conception outlined by Zimmerman 
has certain limitations, the most important of which consists in limiting 
fault to those cases, where the subject is aware of its sources (i.e. of his 
culpable ignorance) and making this issue independent from the regula-
tion of one’s own behavior.15 Meanwhile, the essence of a moral attitude 
is, it seems, precisely the assumption of a certain attitude towards this 
ambiguity concerning the principles of moral action. 
How, then, would the morally-right management of this ignorance 
be possible?
We must note that the discussed issue is not of an epistemologi-
cal character (thus, it is not the fact of ignorance itself—or, in conse-
quence, the question of possible ways of overcoming it—that constitutes 
the essence of the problem here), but of an ethical one. It seems that 
what constitutes the fundamental moral element here from the point 
of view of the acting subject is precisely the awareness of the signifi-
cance of one’s action for others. In other words, the moral significance 
of a given action and the ignorance upon which it is based increase 
with an increase in the irreversible consequences of the given action 
and its significance for the objects of the action. Alexander Guerrero 
calls this moral epistemic contextualism:
13 Roman Ingarden, “O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych” [“Über die Verantwortung. 
Ihre ontischen Fundamente”], in: Książeczka  o  człowieku, trans. A. Węgrzecki, (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1972), pp. 79—100.
14 R. Ingarden, p. 99.
15 Cf. M.J. Zimmerman, Moral Responsibility…, p. 426: “[…] lack of ignorance concerning 
wrongdoing is a root requirement of responsibility. One can have control over one’s vicious 
behaviour, one can have control over one’s vices, one can be aware that one has such control, 
and one can have control over whether one remains ignorant of associated wrongness. And, absent 
such awareness, one is not responsible.”
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How much one is morally required to do from an epistemic point of view with regard 
to investigating some proposition p varies depending on the moral context—on what 
actions one’s belief in p (or absence of belief in p) will license or be used to justify, 
morally, in some particular context.16
What draws attention in this principle’s concentration on the sub-
ject—determining the legitimacy of a principle of action will depend 
on the degree that the subject contemplated, or was able to contem-
plate, the consequences of his action, as well as on how meticulously 
he planned his action (in the sense of undertaking the means to limit 
possible negative consequences). This way, both the scope of the action 
and its possible negative consequences can be examined by the subject 
as premises constituting the occurent beliefs indicated by Zimmerman. 
Formulating the problem in the categories of virtue ethics, we can say 
that the primary consequence of moral epistemic contextualism is that 
it makes caution a virtue, and even a fundamental feature of a moral 
attitude. 
Practicing such a virtue, i.e. true moral reasoning and action 
based on this virtue, would have to, then, consist in examining those 
elements—“blockers,” as Guerrero calls them17—which would force 
the subject to relinquish his action or reformulate the reasoning that 
it is based on. What is of fundamental significance from the point 
of view of the problem discussed here is the contemplation of the sub-
ject’s knowledge about the nature of the object of his actions, i.e. whether 
this object possesses a moral status. Thus, an element that is critical 
par excellence appears in moral thought—for, the fundamental ele-
ment characterizing the moral attitude is not only, as Kant would have it, 
action that refers to its object as to a goal, i.e. an autonomic being endowed 
with dignity, but the prior contemplation of whether and how such a quality 
16 Alexander A. Guerrero, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution,” 
Philosophical Studies, 2007, 136(1), p. 69.
17 “[…] call any state of affairs which, if it obtained, could make it morally impermissible 
to perform some action A, a ‘blocker’ with respect to A. For example, a blocker with respect 
to keeping slaves is the state of affairs of all human beings having the right to self-determination.” 
A. A. Guerrero, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill…,” p. 73.
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could and should be ascribed to this object. In other words, the key element 
of such an attitude is the analysis of whether my action possesses the suffi-
cient foundations. Guerrero solves this problem by constructing a principle 
which he calls “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill” (henceforth abbreviated DKDK):
If someone knows that she doesn’t know whether a living organism has significant 
moral status or not, it is morally blameworthy for her to kill that organism or to have 
it killed, unless she believes that there is something of substantial moral signifi-
cance compelling her to do so.18
A principle formulated thusly permits itself to be generalized in a way 
that allows for it to be applied not only to cases in which the conse-
quence of action is death (as in case of the controversy over the kill-
ing of animals for consumption, or abortion), but to all cases in which 
the object of (at least potential) manipulation is a being that possesses 
a moral status.19 
The acceptance of such a solution seems to have several essential 
advantages. First, the contemplation and application of DKDK must 
lead the subject to concentrate on the conditions of his action’s admissi-
bility, and thus to greater reflectiveness and foresight. In effect, we can 
expect an increase in caution when action is undertaken and a decrease 
in the amount of errors committed, which seems valuable especially 
in those cases where the stakes of such action are high. Second, this 
principle equips the subject with a tool—thanks to the determina-
tion of the probability of the appearance of a “blocker”—allowing him 
to determine both the reasonableness of his action (its legitimacy), 
and to construct an adequate justification. Finally, DKDK seems—
as a result of the above—to at least partially guard the subject against 
the element of luck. On the one hand, as was mentioned, it allows 
the subject to come to terms with the risk of the fiasco of his principles 
of action due to an analysis of probability, consequently opening him 
18 A. A. Guerrero, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill…,” pp. 78–79.
19 See A. A. Guerrero, pp. 92–93 for its alternative formulations.
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up to the possibility of their critical analysis, at least partially protect-
ing him from succumbing to schematism too easily. On the other hand, 
the element of extrinsic luck is limited by both the delimitation of a rea-
sonable boundary of demands imposed on the subject as to the knowl-
edge necessary for him to undertake proper action, and the delimitation 
of a boundary of his responsibility regarding the possible appearance 
of unintended consequences. 
However, DKDK seems to posses two fundamental shortcomings. First, 
the concept of action that it expresses does not allow us to determine 
the nature of the “blockers” that the subject should take into account. Put-
ting aside the issue of their historical and cultural mutability, a particu-
lar subject himself—who does not need to examine this issue—can have 
justified doubts as to what he should take into account in contemplating 
the legitimacy of his action (i.e. how far-reaching the consequences of his 
action that he takes into account should be, or the moral status of what 
beings should be treated as “blockers”). As is, the solution as to the choice 
of relevant “blockers” remains arbitrary. Of course, we cannot expect 
a closed list of them to be given, but it seems that at least a certain class 
of objects or qualities should be given, which the subject who is critically 
analyzing his actions should pay attention to.
Secondly, the acceptance of DKDK or any similar principle as the pri-
mary principle laying down the conditions of actions’ moral value may 
lead to the temptation to relinquish action due to the acceptance of cau-
tion’s preeminence over the acceptance of risk. Not only does it sanc-
tion the preeminence of negative predictions over positive ones, but it 
seems to deny the value of any reasons that are not moral reasons.20 
That is not to say that such a limitation is not justified, but it is not 
universal. That is, such a principle, it seems, could only be a prin-
ciple prima facie. Thus, an alternative appears—if, in accordance 
with DKDK, we cannot be certain as to whether a given being possesses 
20 In truth, we should say that precisely due to granting one-sided precedence to moral 
principles, DKDK sanctions the negative vision of action over the positive. 
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a moral status (or if our action will not lead to negative moral conse-
quences), we can either give up on the action, or act, accepting as our 
goal the achievement of a non-moral good. In the concluding passages 
of Moral Luck, Williams indicates that with the concession of abso-
lute primacy to moral norms “final destruction”21 ensues, the descent 
of various types of values into morality. And indeed, would it not have 
been better for Gauguin to accept the reasoning resulting from a prin-
ciple akin to DKDK and stay at home, sparing his loved ones pain 
and hardship? In other words, should we not be willing to revise our 
non-manipulative premise in the face of important non-moral argu-
ments? This problem becomes visible especially when referred to such 
practices as scientific research, which place their participants in front 
of certain risky experiments every so often in view of achieving sub-
stantial good of a different sort.
It is similar in the case of the precedence of the negative view 
of action. It seems to lead to or impose upon the subject high standards 
of determining the probability of success and estimating any possible 
negative results, or simply to discourage action. The drawback of this 
solution is that, insofar as in the case of individual action such discour-
agement may be justified, in the long run it may mutate into the essen-
tial character flaw syndrome or even neurosis.
The Virtue of Criticism and the Moral Attitude
In what manner can a subject tackle his ignorance? We must note 
that for ethics, this issue becomes a problem when it is character-
ized by a certain regularity—either because it concerns a particular 
type of situation within the boundaries of certain practice, or because 
the subject relatively regularly meets with similar situations. 
It seems that the main element of a moral attitude is not so much 
the ability to achieve certain goods, but rather, first of all, to recognize 
21 B. Williams, Moral Luck…, p. 38.
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the limits of one’s own cognitive abilities and—consequently—of his 
abilities to determine the right principles of action, and second, to mod-
ify them if significant moral reasons appear (“blockers” in Guerrero’s 
understanding). As Nomy Arpaly notes, a virtue such as this, like all 
virtues correcting human deficiencies (courage—cowardice, generosity—
avarice) appears as an answer to humans’ tendency to absolutize their 
own convictions and opinions and their inability to subject them to criti-
cal reflection.22 The virtue whose task it is to regulate one’s relationship 
with his own practical attitude and with possible “blockers” is open-
mindedness. What does this open-mindedness consist in?
It seems that the key factor here is making oneself aware that 
human action usually proceeds on the basis of certain established 
schemes and habits. In accordance with the etymology of this concept, 
a subject’s moral character is nothing more than his or her habitual 
way of referring to reality. The question whether a given subject can 
be treated as praiseworthy is twofold. On the one hand, we must recog-
nize to what degree his or her actions have been subjected to reflection, 
i.e. if the subject asked himself or herself the question of whether his 
or her action was rightful. This is the basic element, and its lack of ful-
fillment signifies that a subject’s action cannot be recognized as morally 
right. At the same time, we must note that the consequences of such 
action are subject to a completely difference evaluation. In this sense, 
the case of Gauguin can be treated in two different ways—on the one 
hand, the way in which the subject made a decision and its praisewor-
thiness or blameworthiness are subject to evaluation; on the other—
its broader, social consequences, which can be categorized as beneficial 
or not, and moral luck also turns out to have a positive value. 
The second element of a moral attitude is the issue of the subject’s 
recognition of his or her own limitations. In characterizing the subject 
possessing the virtue of open-mindedness, Arpaly writes that
22 Nomy Arpaly, “Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue,” American Philosophical Quarterly 
2011, 48(1), p. 80.
246 Piotr Machura
[s]he is the person whose moral concern insulates her from the pull of other concerns 
that could otherwise render her unresponsive to evidence, in contexts in which some-
thing morally significant might be at stake.23
This seems to encompass two elements. First, the question arises 
in which situations the subject should demonstrate particular meticu-
lousness in moral reasoning. Guerrero notes that according to moral 
epistemological contextualism, what causes an action to gain a special 
character is the moral significance of the consequences of the action. 
However, this is only the case when the subject possesses the ability 
to recognize such significance. Accepting that the subject’s manner 
of action, how he is used to responding to his actions is of a habitual 
character, we must also presume that the elements he takes into account 
will be the result of habit. Here, the significance of “blockers” appears—
a subject acting morally should consider the validity of his hitherto 
accepted rules and principles. Such a barrier may be the ability to feel 
pain or the ability to flourish. In consequence, the second aspect of this 
issue is the ability of the subject to modify his own convictions after 
considering the “blockers” and opposing arguments. The point here 
is not to fall into neurotic suspension, but the ability to distance oneself 
from his own convictions and analyze them critically. As Arpaly writes, 
“[t]he open-minded person is not someone who has no opinion, but some-
one who is prevented from being ‘opinionated’—resistant to evidence—
by moral concern […].”24 
Thus, what makes a given attitude moral is the way in which the sub-
ject refers to his actions and convictions. This reference is of a critical 
character in the Kantian sense—for it is, in essence, a transcendental 
analysis of the natural, i.e. derived from habit, way in which the sub-
ject would tend to react to a certain stimulus. The requirement of con-
trolling one’s ignorance as the condition of responsible action, set forth 
by Zimmerman, can, therefore, only be fulfilled when the subject tries 
23 N. Arpaly, “Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue,” p. 81.
24 N. Arpaly, p. 82.
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to make his efforts take on such a form as is determined by all the rele-
vant “blockers” in a given situation. However, it seems that this require-
ment could only be fulfilled if the subject was characterized by a special 
character trait that consist in examining both what he would usually 
take into account in a given situation, and if this usual attitude suf-
fices, i.e. if it really takes all the essential elements into account. In this 
sense, the essence of a moral attitude is summarized by Seneca’s maxim, 
“Reckon on everything, expect everything” (De Ira, III, 16.1)—this con-
stant tension of the intellect’s attention and the will to take into account 
what is morally significant lead to the subject’s action being deemed 
conscious, and, in consequence, moral. 
Conclusions
The legacy of critical thought is of fundamental significance for nor-
mative ethics not only where—as R.M. Hare saw it—we break away 
from real action to establish its principles on a critical level.25 Also—per-
haps primarily—in daily experience, making specific decisions and tak-
ing specific action, moral subjects decide first of all about what the lim-
its of morality are, which arguments should be taken into account, 
and which should be omitted for the decision to be considered legitimate. 
The call to pay attention to the way in which we conduct moral reflec-
tion, the way in which we determine our goals, and what we are used 
to considering the morally-essential limitations of our action is not only 
a call to making the virtue of open-mindedness a key character trait, 
but also, to a great degree, causes the individual’s responsibility to be 
widened so as to encompass not only the practical syllogism, but also 
its primary premises. 
We can accuse this reasoning of accenting the cognitive element 
too strongly at the expense of the conative; that it depreciates the role 
of emotions and creates a false image of ethics as a purely intellec-
25 Richard Mervyn Hare, Moral Thinking. Its Levels, Methods and Point (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981). 
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tual field. Indeed, if it were not for the creative passion that directed 
Gauguin’s action, would he have at all stood before a moral dilemma? 
If it were not for compassion, would the protagonist of Zimmerman’s 
thought experiment have brought help to the victims of the accident?
What differentiates these cases is their relationship to the subject’s 
practical attitude. Insofar as the action of a person saving someone’s life, 
even if done clumsily, results from moral premises, Gauguin’s action does 
not seem to result from a similar motivation; rather, it is the question 
of the maximization of preferences. Thus, what morality seems to add 
to the practical attitude is, as Arpaly26 indicates, a certain type of con-
cern which causes the subject’s emotions to be shaped in a certain way. 
Thus, the primary question of ethics and of a subject guided by its 
moral attitude is, “with what shall I be concerned?” This, on the other 
hand, directs the subject’s attention not only towards given objects 
which may become either the objects of action or the barriers which 
limit such action, but also towards its own consciousness and the way 
in which such objects may be determined to be morally relevant or not. 
As a consequence, one of the elements of the moral attitude will 
be a certain element of uncertainty connected with the open char-
acter of such a critical study. This uncertainty is not only the result 
of the awareness of the subject’s entanglement in luck, but also of the lim-
itations of the subject itself, of his cognitive possibilities or imagination. 
That is precisely why Williams, indicating regret as an emotion charac-
teristic of the subject’s becoming aware of his own limitedness, distin-
guishes subject-regret from the statement of an unfortunate coincidence. 
In the first case, the feeling of regret gives the subject information—
in accordance with the Stoic conception of emotions being carriers 
of information27—not only about the existence of an alternative to his 
or her past actions, but also—more generally—about the limitedness 
of his or her agency. 
26 N. Arpaly, Open-mindedness…, p. 79.
27 Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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It seems, therefore, that what allows for the limitation of the element 
of luck and the justification of a certain boundary of ignorance is precisely 
the demonstration that the subject complied with the standards of critical 
analysis and open-mindedness to all morally-essential elements. 
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Traf, niewiedza i postawa moralna
Streszczenie: W powszechnej opinii przedmiotem etyki winno być badanie i dostar-
czanie ścisłych i niezawodnych reguł działania. Pogląd ten znajduje swoje ugrunto-
wanie w długiej tradycji filozoficznej ciągnącej się od stoików do Kanta co najmniej, 
jest to jednak pogląd fałszywy. Istnieją bowiem dobre racje ku temu, aby zwrócić 
baczniejszą uwagę na te aspekty rozumowania moralnego, które podkreślają ele-
ment ryzyka i niepewności. W artykule pokrótce omawiam dwa z nich: kwestię tra-
fu moralnego i działania opartego na niewiedzy. Refleksja nad tymi zagadnieniami 
prowadzi bowiem do konstatacji, że najbardziej podchwytliwym elementem w rozu-
mowaniu moralnym, jest przekonanie podmiotu o słuszności przesłanek, na których 
buduje on swoje działanie oraz o braku znaczenia czynników zewnętrznych dla oceny 
jego działań. W odniesieniu do tego argumentuję, że podstawowym wymogiem moral-
nego uzasadnienia pewnego działania nie jest jego zgodność z pewnym zestawem 
reguł, lecz raczej krytyczny namysł podmiotu nad własnym działaniem. Tym bowiem, 
co czyni pewną postawę postawą moralną jest w istocie pozamoralny, epistemologicz-
ny czynnik krytycyzmu i otwartości na niepewność.
Słowa kluczowe: etyka, namysł krytyczny, krytycyzm filozoficzny, traf moralny, 
postawa moralna
